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WHEN LOSS REWARDS: THE NEAR-MISS EFFECT IN SLOT 
MACHINE GAMBLING  
 
Gordon R. Foxall & Valdimar Sigurdsson 
Cardiff University & Reykjavik University 
An intriguing feature of near-miss outcomes in slot-machine gambling is that, while 
they are objectively losses, they motivate further play. The “near-miss effect” contra-
dicts standard reinforcement theory in which failure should punish, rather than reward, 
responding. This critical review first examines neurophysiological research which seeks 
correlates and perhaps causes of this effect. The search for a neurophysiological sub-
strate reveals that near-misses recruit similar reward-orientated brain regions to those 
involved in wins. However, two additional research traditions complicate this picture. 
The first seeks “cognitive distortions” that are held to motivate further play in the face 
of near-misses. The second claims that contextual factors, inherent in the programming 
of the machines and the physical arrangement of gambling milieux, modify responses 
to near-miss outcomes. A recurring theme in all research traditions is the role of a pos-
sible source of reinforcement separate from the effect of monetary wins and a potential 
link between this secondary reinforcement and arousal in players. The paper seeks to 
diversify the context of slot-machine gambling by arguing that that it is a form of con-
sumer behavior and, as such, influenced by “informational” or symbolic reinforcement 
as well as by “utilitarian” or functional reinforcement. It compares the behavior of slot-
machine gamblers and its consequences with those of economic consumers generally 
and proposes a framework within which the near-miss phenomenon can be compre-
hended. 
Keywords: Near-miss, slot-machine gambling, consumer behavior, symbolic rein- 
forcement  
____________________ 
 
It is well-established that slot-machine 
gamblers whose scores closely resemble a 
winning combination (but which objectively 
are losses) often seem encouraged thereby to 
continue playing (Côté et al., 2003; Griffiths, 
1995; Reid, 1986; Skinner, 1953). Attempts to 
explain this “near-miss effect” often implicate 
neural functioning (e.g., Qi et al., 2011). After 
all, the same brain regions are recruited in the 
case of near-misses as are apparent for wins 
(notably the reward circuits of the midbrain 
dopaminergic system and the orbitofrontal 
cortex of the forebrain which they innervate), 
__________ 
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while losing activates separate neural areas 
(Chase & Clark, 2010; Habib & Dixon, 
2010). This is consistent with a corpus of re-
search findings indicating that pathological 
gambling (PG) recruits similar neuronal sys-
tems as substance addiction. 
Another explanation invokes “cognitive 
distortion” to account for gamblers’ apparent-
ly judging near-misses as indications that the 
probability of winning has been increased 
(Griffiths, 1994, 1995). This cognitive ap-
proach involves the attribution to gamblers of 
beliefs about the nature of the game, how it 
operates, and their own progress as players. 
Such a judgment might be relevant to the 
learning of a skill, but is unjustified in the 
context of games that have probabilistic out-
comes. But this “gambler’s fallacy” is actual-
ly widespread, as is supported by the finding 
that regular gamblers perceive a greater de-
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gree of skill to be involved in slot-machine 
gambling than do non-regular gamblers and 
that gamblers’ perceived control is related to 
their gambling persistence (Clark et al., 2009, 
2012; Chase & Clark, 2010). An implication 
is that the treatment of problem gamblers 
ought to concentrate on the (re-)learning of 
cognitive judgments by means, inter alia, of 
cognitive-behavior therapy.   
 A third explanation attributes gamblers’ 
persistence to environmental factors that 
would be expected to influence the rate of be-
havioral performance if it were conceptual-
ized as operant (e.g., Hoon et al., 2008). The-
se include the primary and secondary sched-
ules of reinforcement in effect when slot ma-
chines permit near-miss outcomes, and the 
temporal and spatial positioning of symbols 
indicating performance outcomes (e.g., preva-
lence of near misses). This approach eluci-
dates not only the influence that direct, physi-
cal situational factors, such as reinforcement 
schedule(s) and the design configuration of 
the gambling machine, exert on playing but 
also that of gamblers’ verbalizations in the 
course of play that may guide their behavior. 
Research on these “self-rules,” verbalizations 
of the apparent contingencies, may inform the 
search for cognitive distortions that influence 
gamblers’ choices.                                                                                                                                                     
None of these approaches, taken alone, 
provides a comprehensive account of the 
near-miss phenomenon. In order to synthesize 
the disparate results on the near-miss effect, 
this paper argues that the near-miss phenome-
non can be understood if gambling is placed 
within the context of consumer choice. It con-
ceptualizes gambling as a mode of consumer 
behavior within a model of economic choice 
that embraces both routine, everyday buying 
and the extreme consumption involved in ad-
diction. The empirical research generated by 
this behaviorist model of consumption indi-
cates that reinforcement includes both the 
functional or utilitarian benefits of consumer 
behavior and the symbolic or informational 
sources of benefit that are recognized in social 
status and self-esteem. This model, the Be-
havioral Perspective Model of purchase and 
consumption (BPM; Foxall, 1990), integrates 
the neurophysiological, verbal and contextual 
elements identified in research on the near-
miss phenomenon, showing that the construct 
of informational or symbolic reinforcement, 
allied to arousal, provides a key to under-
standing this otherwise anomalous phenome-
non. 
 
NEUROPHYSIOLOGY OF THE NEAR-
MISS 
Classifying PG as an addiction requires 
more than the observation that it is irrational 
or compulsive at the behavioral level. It re-
quires a convincing degree of continuity of 
such gambling with substance addiction. Ross 
et al. (2008) argue that this is the case and that 
PG should be considered a genuine addiction 
on biophysical grounds, indeed the paradigm 
case. This has been supported by some corre-
lational research that has revealed a relation-
ship between PG and a deficiency of the 
mesolimbic dopaminergic reward system. 
Reuters et al. (2005) found a lower activation 
of the right ventral striatum in PG compared 
with a control group and a regression analysis 
revealed negative correlation between signal
changes in the ventral striatum and the severi-
ty of gambling behavior as revealed in a ques-
tionnaire. Notwithstanding this, more argu-
ments regarding gambling as addiction are 
needed, especially as the neurophysiological 
studies tend to deal with correlational issues 
instead of experimental analysis. Hence, pat-
terns of behavior which may become addic-
tive if reinforced might be identifiable 
through early identification of their neuro-
physiological correlates. The widespread as-
sumption that increasingly persistent gam-
bling in the face of near-misses constitutes 
such a precursor of addiction would be sup-
ported if a neurophysiological basis were es-
tablished for it. 
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Griffiths: Psychobiology of the Near-miss   
In early contributions, Griffiths (1990a, 
b, c) drew attention to the biological import of 
research on near-misses, mentioning specifi-
cally investigations of a potential neurophysi-
ological substrate in PGs, the role of arousal 
in gambling, and the role of endorphins. 
Among the literature he reviewed at that time, 
Griffiths (1991) mentioned Carlton and Man-
owitz’s (1987) use of EEG measures to de-
termine whether hemispheric dysregulation is 
related to impulse-control failure. PGs (com-
pared with controls) showed hemispheric ac-
tivation deficits on verbal and nonverbal tasks 
similar to those found in some kinds of Atten-
tion Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder involving 
inattention and impulsivity. In addition, PGs 
tend to be deficient in serotonin, a neuro-
transmitter which inhibits control of inatten-
tion and impulsivity. In the context of a pos-
sible substrate for excessive gambling, Grif-
fiths (1991) also mentioned the work of Roy 
et al. (1988), who found PGs had “a signifi-
cantly higher centrally produced fraction of 
cerebrospinal fluid level of 3-methoxy-4 hy-
droxyphenolglycol” which is believed to 
stimulate impulsive behavior and sensation 
seeking Griffiths, 1990, p. 349).  
The role of arousal is sufficiently estab-
lished in excessive gambling for the comment 
that excitement is the “gambler’s drug” to 
have become a cliché (Brown 1986, 1987). A 
prevalent neurophysiological measure is heart 
rate (HR), which is shown to increase during 
gambling. Also important from the point of 
view of relating neurophysiological and cog-
nitive/social research is the finding that phys-
iological measures of arousal correlate well 
with verbal reports of arousal as a subjective 
reaction (Mehrabian, 1980). Finally, there 
was emerging evidence in 1991 that endor-
phins (endogenous morphine) mimics the ef-
fect of opiates and mediates PG. Despite the 
emerging evidence for a biological basis for 
PG, however, Griffiths (1990) concluded em-
phatically from his own research, based on 
questionnaire and interview methods, that 
both neurophysiological and cognitive factors 
play a part in excessive slot-machine gam-
bling. In particular, persistent gambling en-
tails cognitive bias: illusion of control, biased 
evaluations, near-miss as a reinforcer rather 
than a punisher (see also Reid, 1986). His re-
spondents’ sole recreation was fruit (slot) ma-
chine playing since nothing else stimulated 
them in the same way. They played especially 
when they reported being “depressed” or 
“feeling down,” since the slot machine gam-
bling changed their mood to a “high” (during 
gambling), though this was followed by a 
“low” and, eventually, anger. They mentioned 
excitement, which is immediate albeit short-
lived, as the predominant reinforcer but win-
ning money was also important. Importantly, 
PGs differed from non-PGs in experiencing 
statistically significantly higher levels of ex-
citement during gambling. These results sup-
port the findings of others with respect to 
arousal and endorphins (though the research 
was not specifically intended to elucidate any 
biological substrate). Griffiths speculated that 
arousal, confirmed by his investigation as a 
major reinforcer, may produce endorphins 
leading to tolerance which leads to more 
gambling. Moreover, he suggested that gam-
blers’ representing their near-misses to them-
selves as near-wins might expand their arous-
al which might reinforce play. This is note-
worthy as an early indication that cognitive 
distortion may have a neurophysiological ba-
sis.  
In recent years, considerable sophistica-
tion in the investigation of the neurophysio-
logical basis of the near-miss is apparent in 
two major research programs: by Clark and 
colleagues at Cambridge University, and by 
Dixon and his colleagues at Southern Illinois 
University. Both programs are characterized 
by a strong interdisciplinary methodology 
which allows the neurophysiological and cog-
nitive distortion views of the phenomenon to 
be compared and contrasted. In addition, Dix-
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on’s program has made explicit the role of 
contingencies of reinforcement and behavior-
al rules in the shaping and maintenance of 
near-miss effects. 
 
Clark: Neurophysiology and Cognition   
Employing a laboratory simulation of 
slot-machine gambling,1 Clark et al. (2009) 
reported that both outright monetary wins and 
near-misses activated identical striatal and 
insular circuitry. Moreover, near-misses were 
associated with a greater blood oxygenation 
level-dependent (BOLD) signal in the ventral 
striatum and anterior insula, something also 
achieved by outright wins, and near-misses 
produced additional responses in the meso-
limbic reward system (rostral anterior cingu-
late cortex, midbrain, thalamus) – in similar 
manner to that found in reinforcer processing. 
They implicated the tendency of near-misses 
to recruit the reward circuitry that is the neu-
rophysiological basis of reinforcement as a 
factor that invigorates gambling propensity 
despite the objective lack of reward.  
Clark et al. (2009) also contribute to the 
issue of biological versus cognitive/ behavior-
al causation, reporting that activity in the ros-
tral anterior cingulate cortex varies with per-
sonal control. Those gamblers given the op-
portunity to exercise personal control over 
arranging the gamble reported near-misses as 
less pleasant than full-misses but the former 
nevertheless increased those gamblers’ desire 
to play. Moreover, insular activity for near-
                                                 
1 “The Slot Machine Task.” One of 6 icons having 
been selected on the left-hand reel (by the participant 
or by computer), spinning the right-hand reel reveals 
one or other of the icons. If left- and right-hand icons 
match, the participant receives a small cash prize. A 
mismatch between the icons of one vertical position is 
a “near-miss”; other mismatches, “full-misses.” Fol-
lowing initial icon selection, participants rate their 
chances of winning by responding to the question 
“How do you rate your chances of winning?” Follow-
ing the outcome, participants state how much they want 
to continue to play on the question “How much do you 
want to continue to play the game?” 
 
misses correlated with both a self-reported 
and a questionnaire measure of gambling pro-
pensity. Clark et al. (2009) also recorded sub-
jective verbal responses to near-misses which 
for gamblers with personal control were less 
pleasant than full misses but nevertheless in-
creased the desire to play. This interaction 
between near-miss and personal control could 
be detected in fMRI data: “In the rostral por-
tion of the ACC [anterior cingulate cortex], 
anterior to the genus of the corpus callosum, 
participant-selected near-misses were associ-
ated with a greater BOLD signal than person-
ally-chosen full misses” (Clark et al., 2009, p. 
485) The opposite was observed for comput-
er-chosen trials but the result was not statisti-
cally significant. Both monetary wins and 
near-misses recruited the anterior insula. The 
BOLD signal in this area was associated with 
two aspects of what Clark et al. call “psycho-
logical variables”: a positive correlation be-
tween insula activity and scores on the Gam-
bling Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS), a 
measure of susceptibility to cognitive biases 
(Raylu & Oei, 2004) and a negative correla-
tion between insula activity to near-misses 
and scores on “How much do you want to 
continue to play the game?” Only the insula, 
within the win-related circuit, was predictably 
associated with these verbal behaviors. By 
assuming a combined biological/cognitive 
paradigm, Clark et al. (2009) were able to 
demonstrate neural responses associated with 
near-misses are related to both subjective ex-
perience of these events recorded during 
scanning and a trait-based index of gambling 
propensity on which problem-gamblers exhib-
it significantly elevated scores. 
Chase and Clark (2010) confirm that 
near-misses recruit neuro-circuitry associated 
with the acquisition of behavioral rewards and 
define pathological gambling by reference to 
its neurobiological commonalities with sub-
stance addiction; from the point of view of 
potential treatment their work raises the pos-
sibility that dopamine- (DA-)induced re-
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sponses to gambling may be regulated by the 
impediment of this neurotransmitter.  
fMRI scan data were used to compute 
four contrasts: (i). between monetary wins 
minus non-wins; (ii). near-misses minus full-
misses; (iii). near-misses minus full-misses 
depending on computer- versus participant 
selection of left-hand icon; and (iv). win ac-
tivity for participant-selected versus comput-
er-selected icons. The contrast of all winning 
with all non-winning outcomes (i) revealed 
signal change in areas usually associated with 
reinforcement learning, notably the ventral 
striatum. The contrast of near-miss with full-
miss outcomes (ii) indicated that both recruit-
ed the same striatal regions, despite the non-
win status of both types of outcome. Howev-
er, neither the contrast of wins for participant-
selected minus computer-selected icons (iii) 
nor the interaction contrast for near-miss ac-
tivity as a function of personal control (iv) 
revealed significant neural recruitment within 
the chosen ROI mask.      
The study combined data from two 
sources by computing fMRI responses to 
gambling outcomes by scores on the South 
Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS), a verbal test 
of gambling propensity which enquires of 
borrowing money, lying, etc. (Lesieur & 
Blume, 1987). While SOGS scores did not 
reveal neural correlates of increases or de-
creases in winning, they were related positive-
ly to mid-brain responses and negatively to 
caudate responses to near-miss outcomes. 
Disordered gamblers showed a more pro-
nounced midbrain response to near-misses 
than did others, a finding that contradicts pre-
vious research.     
Clark et al. (2012) present a further study 
in this series, the aim of which was to trace 
the capacity of win, near-miss and full-miss 
outcomes to generate physiological arousal in 
laboratory-based gambling simulations. They 
employed two physiological measures, HR 
and electrodermal activity (EDA). Both were 
found to vary with gambling outcomes. Near-
misses elicited a greater increase in EDA than 
full-misses, especially on player-selected icon 
trials. Near-misses also evoked a higher level 
of HR acceleration than alternative outcomes. 
Overall the results for the neuro-physiological 
measures indicated that “[n]ear-miss out-
comes are capable of eliciting phasic changes 
in physiological arousal consistent with a 
state of subjective excitement, despite their 
objective non-win status” (Clark et al., 2012, 
p. 123). 
The authors also manipulated perceived 
personal control by means of player- (as op-
posed to computer-) icon selection. As in ear-
lier research, near-misses were experienced as 
less pleasant than outright losses but, in the 
case of personal icon choice, were followed 
by a greater verbally reported willingness to 
continue playing. Against the assertion that 
laboratory studies of gambling do not produce 
similar levels of arousal to those encountered 
in real-time gambling (e.g. Brown, 1994; 
Dixon et al., 2010) adduce evidence that the 
kinds of result found by Clark et al. (2012) 
are representative of play on actual video slot 
machines. M. J. Dixon et al. (2010) arranged 
the contingencies of gambling so that players 
whose probability of winning was enhanced 
by increasing the number of gambles made 
for each spin failed nevertheless to recoup the 
amounts they had staked. Such “losses dis-
guised as wins” were associated with similar 
EDA and HR increases to those engendered 
by wins compared to full-losses. 
   
M.R. Dixon: Neurophysiology and Contin-
gency  
Habib and Dixon (2010) were the first re-
searchers to investigate neurophysiological 
and behavioral differences between patholog-
ical and non-pathological gamblers in the 
context of slot machine near-misses. Their 
overriding hypothesis was that pathological 
gamblers would view near-misses as closely 
allied to wins while non-pathological gam-
blers would see them as more akin to the loss-
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es which, objectively, they are. This expecta-
tion was not borne out at the behavioral level: 
both types of gambler rated near-misses as 
close to wins. At the neurophysiological level, 
however, they identified greater overlap be-
tween the win-like elements of near misses 
and the win network for pathological gam-
blers. Moreover, the loss-like aspects of the 
near-miss and the network activated for full 
losses exhibited greater overlap in the case of 
the non-pathological gamblers.        
The authors sought to identify brain re-
gions common to PG and non-PG gamblers 
and those exclusive to each of these groups as 
they experienced the various gambling out-
comes: these were termed the win, near-miss 
and loss networks. The win networks were 
entirely discrete for the two groups. However, 
non-PGs displayed an activation of the right 
superior temporal gyrus that was peculiar to 
that group in the case of wins, while for PGs 
separate activations in the uncus and posterior 
cingulated gyrus constituted the win network: 
Habib and Dixon (2010) note that both of the-
se regions identified for PGs are located in the 
extended medial temporal lobe system. It was 
also possible to define a loss network: for 
losses, activations common to PGs and 
nonPGs were apparent in bilateral medial pa-
rietal region (precuneus), bilateral mid-
dle/superior occipital gyrus, and bilateral su-
perior frontal gyri. A notable difference was 
observed between the PG and non-PG groups’ 
unique loss networks, however. Non-PGs 
demonstrated peculiar activations in a broad 
network including the medial and bilateral 
lateral parietal cortices and the medial, bilat-
eral middle frontal, and left inferior frontal 
gyri. PGs evinced a much smaller loss net-
work consisting only of the right lateral parie-
tal cortex. While the authors recorded no 
more than minimal common activation in the 
case of near-misses, the results were intri-
guing for the identification of the neurophysi-
ology of gambling experience. Non-PGs re-
cruited similar neurology in the case of near-
misses to that found for losses: more precise-
ly, they evinced activation in part of the left 
inferior parietal lobule close to a region that 
was activated for their loss-win contrasts. The 
pattern of association among the networks 
that might be expected on a priori grounds 
was substantiated in the case of PGs: their 
near-miss activations had more in common 
with their wins (win-loss contrasts) located in 
the uncus in the right anterior medial temporal 
lobe as well as the right inferior occipital gy-
rus. These results indicate that non-PG gam-
blers are more realistic in judging the status of 
near-misses, seeing them as losses. PGs, by 
contrast, are disposed to view near-misses as 
more closely related to wins.  
Habib and Dixon (2010) stress not only 
the greater extent of the win network in PGs 
but that in PGs this network comprised “emo-
tional regions of the brain” and elements of 
the midbrain that constitute the reward sys-
tem. This is especially interesting in that all 
players taking part received similar monetary 
rewards for their participation in the experi-
ment but did not receive further compensation 
for winning. They suggest in interpretation 
that wins were more pleasant, positive, or re-
warding for PGs irrespective of monetary 
gain. 
Winstanley, Cocker, and Rogers (2011) 
identify more specifically the neurophysiolog-
ical activity involved in the near-miss by in-
vestigating the role of DA during slot ma-
chine gambling, albeit simulated in rats. The 
construction of research framework in which 
rats’ behavior simulates near-miss activity 
(Zeeb et al., 2009) facilitated experimental 
refinement in the further investigation of 
near-misses’ associations with DA-ergic ac-
tivity in disordered gamblers. For instance, 
Schultz (2002) had implicated the midbrain 
DA-ergic system in generating reward predic-
tion errors (RPEs), and Schott et al. (2008) 
demonstrated that monetary rewards produce 
BOLD reactions and related striatal DA 
transmission. More specifically, Chase and 
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Clark (2010) argued that positive RPEs occur 
as gamblers foresee a win when the right-
hand reel slows, negative RPEs when its 
stopping reveals a no-win. Positive RPEs are 
especially associated with BOLD signals, 
suggesting a neural basis for the gamblers’ 
overconfident beliefs. These effects are diffi-
cult to demonstrate for in situ human gam-
blers for technical and ethical reasons. Win-
stanley et al. (2011) arranged contingencies so 
that rats’ responses determined whether flash-
ing lights were lit/unlit: three illuminated 
lights constituted a win. Each trial concluded 
with the opportunity for the rat to select the 
collection of rewards for wins, incurring also 
a time penalty for losses, or a new trial. The 
rats’ preferred the collect option if even two 
lights were lit, suggesting an analogy with 
near-misses in human gambling. “Near-
misses” apparently engender a reward expec-
tancy similar to that characteristic of a win.  
Qi et al. (2011) measured event related 
potentials (ERPs) in an examination of the 
neural and cognitive correlates of the near-
miss effect. As in other research gamblers rat-
ed near-misses less pleasant than full misses 
but found them more motivating. P300 ampli-
tude increased from the full miss condition to 
that of the near-miss. Further analysis indicat-
ed that the initiators of the P300, located in 
the putamen and OFC, may be involved, re-
spectively in motivational evaluation and re-
gret. The authors argue that the near-miss 
phenomenon may have dual origins in higher 
motivational level and the incidence of regret 
resulting from counterfactual thinking. 
 
Summing-up: Neurophysiology    
Wins activate neural systems related to 
reward and DA release while no-wins fail to 
do so. Near-successful behavior is likely to be 
reinforced during the acquisition of skills, en-
hancing further improvement. But a gambling 
near-miss does not affect the probability of a 
subsequent win. The consequent intellectual 
challenge is to account for the influence of 
non-winning gamblers’ cognitive responses to 
near-misses (i.e., their apparently illogical 
persistence in playing). Further research sug-
gested by the authors may corroborate these 
findings by investigating, first, whether prob-
lem gamblers’ generalizations of reward-
predictive stimuli (e.g., contextual stimuli 
present prior to or simultaneously with gam-
bling) correlate with midbrain activity; and 
second, whether midbrain neurons code adap-
tively to anticipated reward levels (Chase & 
Clark, 2010).     
One line of critical review of the neuro-
physiological approach to explaining near-
misses involves minutely analyzing the meth-
ods employed and proffering advice on im-
provement. Judging from the commonalities 
revealed by results from several highly-
reputable international laboratories and the 
contrasting methodological positions of the 
researchers, such recommendations would be 
incremental at best. An alternative critique 
contextualizes neurophysiological research by 
highlighting alternative insights into the near-
miss phenomenon and links with the neuro-
physiological approach. This perspective is 
more likely to engender the inter-disciplinary 
synthesis that understanding near-misses re-
quires. 
 
COGNITIVE DISTORTION 
A near-miss is not an outcome that actu-
ally “comes close to being successful” as in 
Reid’s (1986, p. 32) definition: it is an out-
right failure that may be interpreted by the 
gambler as approximating a win. Explanation 
of the subsequent patterns of playing in terms 
of cognitive distortion take as its key variable 
not the objectively observable similarity of 
the pattern of symbols achieved to those that 
denote a win but the interpretation put upon 
this by the gambler. Its interpretation in terms 
of “closeness” is an independent variable for 
those researchers who seek to explain losing 
gamblers’ persistence by invoking it; it is also 
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Necessary to view it as a dependent variable, 
enquiring of its causal origins.  
Several of the studies reviewed above 
investigated cognitive distortion in addition to 
the neurophysiological basis of the near-miss. 
The tendency for slot-machine gamblers to be 
motivated by near-misses to continue gam-
bling has been shown to depend on the illu-
sion that their selecting the target icon in-
creases their personal control over the out-
come of the gamble (Dixon et al., 2007). A 
feeling of personal control also results from 
the belief that playing slot machines success-
fully is a matter of skill and that apparently 
coming close to winning signals its acquisi-
tion. Some tasks are perfected by the acquisi-
tion of skill through practice but in the cases 
of sports performance and accuracy in elec-
tronic information processing, for instance, 
there is a genuine probability that continued 
performance will enhance expertise. This is 
not so in gambling where the probability of 
winning is reset on each trial (Langer, 1975). 
Slot-machine design nevertheless takes ad-
vantage of the illusion of control through skill 
by affording players the opportunity of 
“nudging” or “holding” their icons in order 
seemingly to influence the generation of a 
winning line. Moreover, the self-perception of 
skillfulness is higher among PGs than other 
gamblers (Griffiths, 1990). Griffiths (1994) 
reported that irrational statements about win-
propensities are more frequent among more-
regular than other gamblers, though the inci-
dence of irrational verbalizations was lower in 
his study of arcade gamblers than earlier re-
search (e.g. Ladouceur, 1988) encountered. 
Griffiths (1994) interpreted his own research, 
nonetheless, as confirming the general trend 
of work on cognitive bias. Importantly, he 
found that regular gamblers were more likely 
than others to comprehend their behavior in 
terms of the acquisition of a skill.  
Ariyabuddhiphongs and Phengphol 
(2008) sought to establish the relative im-
portance of near-miss, gambler’s fallacy, and 
entrapment on gambling persistence; entrap-
ment is a variation of the sunk-cost effect in 
which, having invested so much time and 
money in a pursuit, the individual feels the 
costs of quitting are insuperable, hence per-
sists. A model measuring the independent ef-
fects of the independent variables on the de-
pendent shows that near-miss alone has a 
strong and significant effect on behavior; the 
other two independent variables are weak and 
non-significant. However, a model which ex-
amines the effects of gambler’s fallacy and 
entrapment, mediated by near-miss, on gam-
bling behavior fit the data as closely as the 
initial model. The overall conclusion is that 
the strong effect of near-miss on gambling 
motivation is strengthened by the other two 
variables.    
Wohl and Enzle (2003) revealed that 
more important in gambling motivation than 
the incidence or magnitude of a gain or loss is 
the extent to which the gambler feels lucky. 
The subjective experience of luck is, in turn, 
influenced by whether a modest win ($10) is 
presented as the near-miss of a JACKPOT 
(delivering $70) or of BANKRUPT. These 
outcomes are hypothesized as involving up-
ward or downward counterfactual thinking, 
respectively. As predicted, gamblers who 
have escaped a near big loss feel luckier than 
those avoiding a near big gain and are indeed 
more likely to continue gambling, perhaps as 
a result of the arousal felt as a result of being 
lucky. Self-perception of luck in an individual 
who has narrowly avoided a big loss is greater 
and this eventuates in continued play. Self-
perception of luck is reduced in the player 
who narrowly misses a large pay-out and may 
thereafter doubt their ability to gain the jack-
pot. Daugherty and MacLin (2007) conducted 
a follow-up research related to Wohl and 
Enzle (2003) and found that only participants 
who experienced near win situations at a high 
rate (45% levels) persisted in their gambling 
behaviors more than the participants in other 
conditions. Furthermore, Dixon and Schreiber 
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(2004) question the capacity of cognitive dis-
tortion to explain the near-miss phenomenon 
characterizing such bias, from a behavior ana-
lytic perspective, as “a hypothetical construct 
within or characteristic of the individual re-
sponsible for an illogical calculation of the 
reality that explains gambling behavior “ (p. 
336). They also reject Reid’s (1986) conjec-
ture that near-misses constitute reinforcers 
because they generate arousal in similar fash-
ion to wins. They broadly endorse Griffiths’s 
(1999) suggestion that near-misses are a sort 
of feedback that encourages further play, 
though they are skeptical of his idea that near-
misses constitute a reward in themselves. 
These are all ideas that need to be taken seri-
ously in formulating a general model of near-
miss response.  
In their own work, Dixon and Schreiber 
(2004) recorded response latency between 
plays (trials or spins), and the type of outcome  
(win, near-miss, or loss). All participants (12 
undergraduates knowledgeable of slot-
machine use) reported that their near-misses 
more closely approximated a win than a loss. 
Moreover, all but one participant estimated 
higher estimations of a near-miss when the 
similar symbols on the payout line were adja-
cent. Dixon and Schreiber (2004) propose ten-
tatively that two adjacent symbols are visually 
closer to the three required for a win than the 
separated symbols. Response latencies for 8 
participants were longer in the case of win-
ning; the 4 exceptions showed much greater 
response latency following a near-miss than a 
full miss. These results corroborate earlier 
work by the authors (Dixon & Schreiber, 
2002; Schreiber & Dixon, 2001) who suggest 
that the losing trial is an aversive stimulus 
from which the gambler seeks to escape 
quickly (negative reinforcement). This “nega-
tive reinforcement and avoidance paradigm” 
is supported by the longer response latencies 
shown by three-quarters of the participants 
after near-misses as opposed to full-misses, 
raising the possibility that near-misses do re-
inforce in some way. Schreiber and Dixon 
(2004) raise the possibility that a near-miss is 
a verbal event, that gambling is reinforced by 
the player’s saying to him/herself “Wow! 
Nearly made it!” or similar.      
Dixon et al. (2007) showed that partici-
pants in video poker games prefer to gamble 
on the basis of cards they have chosen per-
sonally rather than which have been selected 
by computer. A similar effect is apparent in 
roulette where players prefer self-selected 
numbers over those chosen by the experi-
menter (Dixon et al., 1998). However, 
Weatherly and Flannery-Woehl (2009) coun-
ter the view that cognitive fallacies predict 
slot-machine gambling based on an empirical 
investigation of the value of such biases in the 
prediction of gambling behavior. Fallacious 
beliefs, assessed by questionnaire, were used 
to predict financial gambling on video poker 
and slot machines. Erroneous beliefs were 
poor predictors of actual gambling; in the sin-
gle instance in which they predicted gambling 
behavior, they were associated with less ra-
ther than more. 
   
Summing Up: Cognitive Distortion 
Any suggestion that cognitive distortion 
is the principal influence on gambling persis-
tence requires qualification. First, it is diffi-
cult to establish that beliefs influence behav-
ior since, like other cognitive ascriptions, they 
are not directly amenable to experimental in-
vestigation. They are at best an inference that 
raises the philosophical question how cogni-
tive factors produce neurological effects. Sec-
ondly, near-misses are associated with neural 
changes that are known to be influential in 
motivating behavior through an established 
reward mechanism. Although cognitive dis-
tortion may be a by-product of the near-miss 
which, when verbally expressed, predicts fur-
ther gambling, it is difficult to accord it causal 
preference over the mesolimbic reward sys-
tem. Cognitive distortion may well be a result 
of the arousal engendered by the activation of 
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this system by near-misses, in which case it is 
itself an effect of past behavior rather than a 
cause of future play. Hence, any attempt to 
treat PG by acting directly on biased beliefs is 
unlikely to succeed. Thirdly, an alternative 
perspective which considers contextual influ-
ences on gambling persistence in the face of 
near-misses, including those inherent in rule-
governed behavior, suggests a means of inte-
grating neurophysiological and behavioral 
research. 
  
CONTINGENCIES OF 
REINFORCEMENT 
The near-miss phenomenon is puzzling 
for behaviorists who interpret monetary gains 
as reinforcers (consequential stimuli that in-
crease rate of responding) and their absence 
as punishers (that reduce it). While there are 
few such and even Skinner (1953) interpreted 
near-misses as reinforcing behavior, 
knowledge of the effects of reinforcement 
contingencies on gambling is valuable for 
three reasons. First, they permit further criti-
cal analysis of the neurophysiological ap-
proach to explaining near-misses. Secondly, 
they suggest theoretical enhancement of the 
behavior analysis of gambling. Thirdly, they 
suggest how ways in which treatment pro-
grams might benefit.  
Haw (2009) investigated two aspects of 
reinforcement contingencies in an experiment 
in which students were allowed to select one 
of two machines on which to play. These 
were the frequency of pay-outs (wins) and 
payback rate. Both predicted when individu-
als changed machines but not overall machine 
choice. Those participants who did change 
machines, however, revealed a preference for 
the machine programmed with the larger pay-
back rate (though not for that providing the 
greater frequency of wins) indicating a rela-
tionship between learning history (prior rein-
forcement) and machine selection. Haw 
(2008) reported that the effectiveness of vari-
able ratio and random ratio schedules derives 
not from the average frequency of wins they 
engender, as is widely believed, but from the 
number of early wins and unreinforced trials.  
The density of programmed near-misses 
may be more important in sustaining play 
than big wins. Kassinove and Schare (2001) 
used machines programmed to produce near-
misses at different rates (15%, 30% and 45%). 
Wins of $10 (“big” for the undergraduate par-
ticipants) were also programmed to occur. 
Gambling persistence was assessed as the 
number of trials undertaken during extinction 
(i.e., when the near-miss and big-win out-
comes were no longer available). Near-miss 
rate was significantly related to persistence 
(the 30% near-miss contingency produced the 
greatest persistence) but the big-win contin-
gency was not. A further experiment indicated 
that when a 0% near-miss outcome was in-
cluded, the highest level of persistence was 
produced by the (coincidentally?) greatest 
density of near-misses (45%).        
Ghezzi et al. (2006) examined the effects 
of win magnitude and near-miss frequency on 
persistence in a series of three experiments in 
which near-miss effects took a variety of 
forms. In Experiment 1, the number of trials 
played in normal, rewarded, play was maxim-
ized when near-misses constituted 66% of 
outcomes (alternatives were 0%, 33% and 
100%). The second experiment revealed that 
maximum persistence accompanies medium 
sized wins and 0% near-misses. The third 
showed that a 33% rate of near-misses indi-
cated by adjacent symbols to the right of the 
payout window, secured the most endurance. 
The experiment conducted by MacLin et al. 
(2007) required a group of students who gam-
bled recreationally to play slot machines pro-
grammed to produce wins on a VR5 schedule. 
The machines differed, however, in the rate at 
which they generated near-misses: 15%, 30% 
and 45%. In a pre-extinction phase, the 45% 
contingency generated the greatest level of 
play. Weatherly et al. (2009) report that fe-
male non-PGs gambling on commercial slot 
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machines which paid out at different rates did 
not invariably prefer the machine with the 
highest pay-out. The authors conclude that 
neither the programmed nor the obtained rein-
forcement rate controlled gambling behavior, 
and argue that behavior analysts seek to com-
prehend gambling in terms other than those of 
“direct, contingency-driven” outcomes. 
Nastally et al. (2010) report a study of contex-
tual control of slot machine gamblers’ behav-
ior based on different colored machines (see 
also Zlomke & Dixon, 2006). Hoon et al. 
(2008, p. 467) also found that “participants 
allocated most of their responses to the slot 
machine that shared formal properties of color 
with the contextual cue for more than”. 
 
Summing-up: Contingencies of Reinforce-
ment   
The efficacy of contextual factors includ-
ing reinforcement contingencies derives from 
their capacity to evoke arousal in gamblers. 
Arousal may result from a surprise gambling 
outcome due to changing schedules of reward 
or symbolic features such as flashing lights 
and loud noises that accompany not only a 
large win but a narrow win or even a loss 
masquerading as a “near-miss.” Such symbol-
ic reinforcement undoubtedly has neural cor-
relates (though these have not been investi-
gated in research seeking causes of the near-
miss phenomenon) and counterparts in gam-
blers’ verbal behavior that may indicate cog-
nitive distortion. More sophisticated behavior 
analytic research that takes into consideration 
gamblers’ verbalizations of the contingencies 
they perceive to be in operation (e.g. Dixon & 
Delaney, 2006; Nastally, 2010, Wood & 
Clapham 2006), which is beyond the scope of 
this review, promises to enhance this avenue 
of investigation and link it more closely with 
that concerning cognitive distortion. 
 
 
   
ADDICTIVE GAMBLING AS 
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 
A recurring theme in all three research 
perspectives reviewed is the role of arousal as 
a consequence of near-misses which resem-
bles that felt during win and impacts subse-
quent behavior similarly. A second theme is 
discussion of the role of slot machine symbols 
and audio effects as reinforcers of some kind, 
a conclusion that has been tentatively accept-
ed, though sometimes without strong convic-
tion by behaviorists and cognitivists alike. 
While monetary rewards perhaps remain the 
primary source of behavioral reinforcement, 
symbols are a secondary influence on behav-
ioral continuity. This is consonant with a the-
ory of consumer choice which embraces 
compulsive and addictive behaviors such as 
problem and pathological gambling (Foxall & 
Sigurdsson, 2012). 
The theory posits that consumer motiva-
tion is the outcome of two sources of rein-
forcement, utilitarian or functional (this 
would include monetary rewards in gambling) 
and informational or symbolic (such as the 
signs of near-misses displayed on slot ma-
chines). There is considerable evidence, first, 
for the role of symbolic reinforcement in 
maintaining non-compulsive consumer behav-
ior and, secondly, for the capacity of symbolic 
reinforcement to engender arousal. Both sym-
bolic reinforcement and arousal are closely 
related to verbal behavior and rule-
governance both of which assume importance 
in the explanation of the near-miss effect in 
terms of contingencies of reinforcement. 
According to the BPM the emotional 
states are a direct outcome of the reinforce-
ment contingencies (Foxall, 2011; Foxall & 
Yani-de-Soriano, 2011; Rolls, 2005). During 
the Primrose Path gambling is governed by 
informational (mostly social) more than the 
utilitarian (monetary) results, and often moti-
vated through social drinking and organized 
gambling in public places. As reinforcing so-
cial approval is overtaken by the addictive 
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consequences of monetary and symbolic con-
sequences, the contexts become progressively 
more closed. Symbolic reinforcement occurs 
as a consequence of the PG’s conditioning 
history. 
The critical aspect of this history involves 
a correspondence between the colors, lights 
and sound generated by gambling machines in 
response to so-called near-misses. These ef-
fects do not only arbitrarily signal a reduction 
in time to reinforcement (Fantino & Logan, 
1979), but are also correlated with aroused 
happiness to this performance feedback. This 
can be defined in terms of the facial expres-
sion or vocalization sometimes shown by 
PG’s when “winning” (Dixon, Nastally, & 
Waterman, 2010; Green & Reid, 1996), or 
with the use of subjective rating scales (e.g., 
Foxall & Yani-de-Soriano, 2011; Foxall, 
Yani-de-Soriano, Yousafzai, & Javed, in 
press), to provide a means of relating emo-
tional responses to contingencies of rein-
forcement. With the PG’s sources of motiva-
tion to gamble tied to utilitarian as well as to 
symbolic sources, the situation gets closer to 
an errorless discrimination contingency as the 
system  does not give as many chances of 
“mistakes” as one would think. It needs to be 
studied more carefully if and how the symbol-
ic feedback increases its reinforcement value 
and capabilities to arouse positive feelings as 
gambling progresses. As the symbolic rein-
forcement seems to diminish the aversive ef-
fects from the normal extinction generated 
from losses, similar as happens with errorless 
discrimination training, it is of value to meas-
ure the intensity of aversive emotions general-
ly detected during extinction. 
It is well established (Azrin, Hutchinson, 
& Hake, 1966) that animals and humans often 
show aggressive responses during extinction 
and as such the arousal, the intensity of the 
emotion, should be part of the functional 
analysis. Furthermore, there is evidence that 
suggests that PG may be maintained by nega-
tive reinforcement or an escape function (Mil-
ler, Dixon, Parker, Kulland, & Weatherly, 
2010; Weatherly, Montes, & Christopher, 
2010). This needs to be studied with laborato-
ry methods as well as with field studies, if 
boredom – a low arousal state, is systemati-
cally related to gambling behavior. Dixon, 
Nastally, and Waterman (2010) showed for 
example that a simulated gambling activity 
that did not involve monetary outcomes in-
creased happiness levels in elderly individu-
als. This begs the question how different 
combinations of utilitarian and informational 
reinforcement work on operant gambling be-
havior and classically conditioned emotional 
responses in normal populations compared to 
PG’s and how the effectiveness and emotions 
changes during different stages of gambling. 
The further investigation of PG and other 
forms of addiction in terms of a broad contin-
uum of consumer choice seems indicated by 
the foregoing critical review. Equally, an ap-
proach to treatment based on changing sym-
bolic reinforcement and verbal behavior is 
more likely to produce effective results than 
one that emphasizes cognitive dysfunction 
and seeks to change beliefs and desires that 
are not empirically available.  
Conceptualizing gambling and addiction 
as consumer behavior emphasizes the conti-
nuity between routine purchasing decisions 
(e.g., food brand choices) which exhibit a sto-
chastic selection of alternatives (Ehrenberg, 
1988) and extreme modes of consumptions 
marked by compulsion. The analysis of fac-
tors influencing the more amenable modes of 
consumption, the routine choices, suggests 
how more extreme behaviors may be defined 
and studied. The routine and extreme con-
sumer behaviors just mentioned are polar ex-
tremes on a continuum that also includes 
credit buying, environmental despoliation and 
compulsive purchasing. All of these are influ-
enced by a similar array of genetic, neurobio-
logical, economic, contextual, and cultural 
factors (Foxall, 2010; Heyman, 2009), though 
these differ in salience according to the nature 
12
Analysis of Gambling Behavior, Vol. 6 [2012], Art. 2
https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/agb/vol6/iss1/2
  GORDON R. FOXALL & VALDIMAR SIGURDSSON 7
   
 
of the behavior in question. The location of a 
particular consumer behavior on the continu-
um is a measure of the impulsivity/self-
control shown by the consumer. Although ad-
diction has been shown to follow the match-
ing law (Herrnstein, 1997), it is only recently 
that routine consumer behaviors have been 
shown to exhibit this process (e.g., Foxall et 
al., 2007) which underlies temporal discount-
ing. Indeed, consumer behaviors are marked 
by temporal discounting regardless of their 
positioning on the continuum, albeit to differ-
ing extents. Findings generated by a model of 
consumer behavior for the more routine be-
haviors may therefore generate understanding 
of more impulsive forms of choice.  
For instance, research inspired by BPM 
identifies two sources of reinforcement that 
are germane to the shaping and maintenance 
of economic behaviors: utilitarian (functional) 
and informational (symbolic/social) which act 
in tandem to affect consumer choices that re-
flect different underlying patterns of consum-
er valuations of the products chosen, meas-
ured in terms of differing elasticities of de-
mand and levels of essential value (Foxall, 
Yan, Oliveira-Castro, & Wells, in press; Yan 
et al., in press a, in press b). The relevance of 
this to the present discussion lies in the verbal 
nature of informational reinforcement which 
reflects social norms of performance (in 
terms, for example, of social status and es-
teem). Symbolic reinforcement of this kind 
has been reliably related to emotional feelings 
of arousal in eight studies of consumer re-
sponse to a wide range of consumption envi-
ronments (Foxall, Yani-de-Soriano, 
Yousafzai, & Javed, in press), a finding that is 
highly relevant to the results for near-miss 
gambling discussed in this paper.  
The import of interpreting these results in 
terms of informational reinforcement is that 
the outcomes of near-misses are in themselves 
as reinforcing as monetary gains; moreover,  
the efficacy of these symbolic reinforcers is 
enhanced by the arrangement of the parapher-
nalia of gambling, namely the ways in which 
slot machines respond to play-outcomes that 
are actually losses in similar fashion to those 
that are outright wins. We can now under-
stand why the sights and sounds generated by 
gambling machines in response to so-called 
near-misses are as effective in promoting fur-
ther gambling as the financial gains that fol-
low unmistakable successes. It is perfectly 
comprehensible why the cognitive mediation 
of these rewards by gamblers results in their 
reporting that they are feeling lucky and want 
to continue playing. It is not a matter of loss 
being rewarding: a near-miss is as much a 
successful outcome in view of the symbolic 
meaning it has acquired in the course of a 
gambling history as it would be if every near-
miss were marked by the receipt of money. 
The application of the consumer behavior 
model to gambling confirms what has been 
suspected: that the potency of slot machine 
gambling as a potential contributor to person-
al and social disruption is not as likely to be 
meliorated by the manipulation of schedules 
of reinforcement that govern the payout rate 
to gamblers as by the control of the symbolic 
reinforcers that influence arousal and thereby 
promote continued playing. 
      
CONCLUSIONS 
The assiduity with which casino manag-
ers and machine manufacturers seek to incor-
porate features that reward failure as well as 
success provides eloquent testimony to their 
practical value. The scale of gambling prob-
lems encourages critical reviewers to move 
beyond the minutiae of proliferating findings 
to the synthesis of salient results into applica-
ble models for research and treatment. This is 
a time for bold conclusions rather than pre-
scriptions for further penetration of well-worn 
paths. The consumer behavior framework out-
lined here is capable of integrating the biolog-
ical, economic, social, and situational influ-
ences on gambling behavior that are known to 
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be closely connected with the incidence of the 
near-miss effect. 
 
Further research 
Additional evidence is required of the 
role of experience in determining structural 
differences between PGs and non-PGs. There 
is certainly plenty of evidence that experience 
changes brain structures in laboratory enrich-
ment studies, and in the study of London taxi 
cab drivers, so why not gamblers? 
Various addictions, both drug-dependent 
and non-drug problematic behaviors, such as 
PG seem to share similar neurobiological 
foundations (Martin & Petry, 2005). With in-
creased experience, the vulnerable individual 
develops increased sensitization, or inverse 
tolerance, a neuroadaptive response that is to 
a large degree dependent on context and 
learning (Berridge & Robinson, 2003). This 
alters neuronal circuitry involved in the nor-
mal processes of motivational operations and 
reinforcement. PG is characterized by 
changed reinforcement contingencies, the in-
capacity to experience or be motivated by re-
inforcers usually working in the local envi-
ronment. This is due to reduced sensitivity to 
endogenous brain dopamine, and a striking 
responsiveness to cues that are associated 
with gambling, both inside the skin (e.g. anxi-
ety or depressive symptoms) and in the envi-
ronment. What is, though, missing in the lit-
erature are longitudinal studies looking at the 
long-term effects of gambling on brain chem-
istry. 
 
REFERENCES 
American   Psychiatric  Association    (2000),  
DSM-IV. Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association. 
Amsel, A. (1958). The role of frustrative non 
reward in noncontinuous reward situa-
tions, Psychologtical Bulletin, 55, 102-
119. 
  
Ariyabuddhiphongs, V., & Phengphol, V. 
(2008). Near miss, gambler’s fallacy and 
entrapment: their influence on lottery 
gamblers in Thailand. Journal of Gam-
bling Studies, 24, 295-305. 
Azrin, N. H., Hutchinson, R. R., & Hake, D. 
F. (1966). Extinction-induced aggression. 
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of 
Behavior, 9, 191-204. 
Berridge, K. C., & Robinson, T. E. (2003). 
Parsing reward. Trends in Neurosciences, 
26, 507-513. 
Carlton, P. L., & Manowitz, P. (1987). Physi-
ological factors in determinants of patho-
logical gambling. Journal of Gambling 
Behavior, 3, 274-285.   
Chase, H. W., & Clark, L. (2010). Gambling 
severity predicts midbrain response to 
near-miss outcomes. Journal of Neurosci-
ence, 30, 6180-6187.   
Clark, L. (2010). Decision making during 
gambling: an integration of cognitive and 
psychobiological approaches. Philosophi-
cal Transactions of the Royal Society B, 
365, 319-330. 
Clark, L., Lawrence, A. J., Astley-Jones, F., 
& Gray, N. (2009). Gambling near-misses 
enhance motivation to gamble and recruit 
win-related brain circuitry, Neuron, 61, 
481-490. 
Clark, L., Crooks, B., Clarke, R., Aitken, M. 
R., & Dunn, B. D. (2012). Physiological 
responses to near-miss outcomes and per-
sonal control during simulated gambling, 
Journal of Gambling Studies, 28,  123-37.  
Côté, D., Caron, A., Aubert, J., Desrochers, 
V.. & Ladouceur, R. (2003). New wins 
prolong gambling on a video lottery ter-
minal, Journal of Gambling Studies, 18, 
433-438. 
Daugherty, D., & MacLin, O.H. (2007). Per-
ceptions of luck: Near wins and near loss 
experiences. Analysis of Gambling Behav-
ior, 1, 123-132. 
 
14
Analysis of Gambling Behavior, Vol. 6 [2012], Art. 2
https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/agb/vol6/iss1/2
  GORDON R. FOXALL & VALDIMAR SIGURDSSON 7
   
 
Dixon, M. J., Harrigan, K. A., Sandhu, R., 
Collins, K., & Fufelsang, J. A. (2010). 
Losses disguised as wins in modern multi-
line video slot machines, Addiction, 105, 
1819-1824. 
Dixon, M. R. (2000). Manipulating the illu-
sion of control: Variations in risk-taking 
as a function of perceived control over 
chance outcomes, The Psychological Rec-
ord, 50, 705—720. 
Dixon, M. R., & Delaney, J. (2006). The im-
pact of verbal behavior on gambling be-
haviour. In Ghezzi, P. M., Lyons, C. A., 
Dixon, M. R. & Wilson, G. R. (Eds.) 
Gambling: Behavior Theory, Research 
and Application. (pp. 171-189). Reno, 
NV: Context Press. 
Dixon, M. R., Nastally, B. L., & Waterman, 
A. (2010). The effect of gambling activi-
ties on happiness levels of nursing home 
residents. Journal of Applied Behavior 
Analysis, 43, 531-535. 
Dixon, M.R., & Schreiber, J.B. (2004). Near-
miss effects on response latencies and win 
estimations of slot machine players. The 
Psychological Record, 54, 335-348. 
Dixon, M. R., Jackson, J. W., Delaney, J., 
Holton, B., & Crothers, M. C. (2007). As-
sessing and manipulating the illusion of 
control of video poker players, Analysis of 
Gambling Behavior, 1, 90-108. 
Dixon, M. R., Nastally, B. L., Jackson, J. W., 
& Habib, R. (2009). Altering the “near-
miss” effect in slot machine gamblers, 
Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 42, 
913-918.  
Dixon, M. R., Nastally, B. L., Haha, A. D., 
Horner-King, M., & Jackson, J. W. 
(2009). Blackjack players demonstrate the 
near miss effect. Analysis of Gambling 
Behavior, 3, 56-61.  
Fantino, E., & Logan, C. A. (1979). The ex-
perimental analysis of behavior: A biolog-
ical perspective. San Francisco, CA: W. 
H. Freeman. 
Foxall, G. R. (2010) Accounting for consumer 
choice: Inter-temporal decision-making in 
behavioral perspective. Marketing Theory, 
10, 315-345. 
Foxall, G. R. (2011). Brain, emotion and 
contingency in the explanation of 
consumer behaviour. International Review 
of Industrial and Organizational 
Psychology, 26, 47-92.     
Foxall, G. R., & Sigurdsson, V. (2012). Drug 
use as consumer behavior. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 34, 313—314. 
Foxall, G. R., Oliveira-Castro, J. M., James, 
V. K., & Schrezenmaier, T. C. M. (2007). 
The Behavioral Economics of Brand 
Choice. London and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Foxall, G. R., Yan, J., Oliveira-Castro, J. M., 
& Wells, V. K. (in press). Brand-related 
and situational influences on demand elas-
ticity. Journal of Business Research.  
Foxall, G. R., & Yani-de-Soriano, M. (2011). 
Influence of reinforcement contingencies 
and cognitive styles on affective respons-
es: An examination of Rolls' theory of 
emotion in the context of consumer 
choice. Journal of Applied Social Psy-
chology, 41, 2508-2537.  
Foxall, G. R., Yani-de-Soriano, M., Yousafzai, 
S., & Javed, U. (in press). The role of 
neurophysiology, emotion and 
contingency in the explanation of 
consumer choice. In  Wells, V. K. & 
Foxall, G. R. (Eds.) Handbook of 
Developments in Consumer Behaviour. 
Cheltenham, Glos. and Northampton, 
MA: Edward Elgar. 
Ghezzi, P. M., Wilson, G. R., & Porter, J. C. 
K. (2006). The near-miss effect in simu-
lated slot machine play. In Ghezzi, P. M., 
Lyons, C. A., Dixon, M. R., & Wilson, G. 
R. (Eds.) Gambling: Behavior Theory, 
Research and Application. (pp. 155-170). 
Reno, NV: Context Press. 
 
15
Foxall and Sigurdsson: When Loss Reward: The Near-Miss Effect in Slot Machine Gamblin
Published by theRepository at St. Cloud State, 2012
6 WHEN LOSS REWARDS  
 
Green, C. W., & Reid, D. H. (1996). Defin-
ing, validating, and increasing indices of 
happiness among people with profound 
multiple disabilities. Journal of Applied 
Behavior Analysis, 29, 67-78. 
Griffiths, M. (1990a). The cognitive psychol-
ogy of gambling. Journal of Gambling 
Studies, 6, 31-42. 
Griffiths, M. (1990b). Addiction to fruit ma-
chines: a preliminary study among males. 
Journal of Gambling Studies, 6, 113-126. 
Griffiths, M. (1990c).The acquisition, devel-
opment and maintenance of fruit machine 
gambling in adolescents, Journal of Gam-
bling Studies, 6, 193-204. 
Griffiths, M. (1991). Pyschobiology of the 
near-miss in fruit machine gambling, The 
Journal of Psychology, 125, 347-357. 
Griffiths, M. (1994). The role of cognitive 
bias and skill in fruit machine gambling, 
British Journal of Psychology, 85, 351-
369. 
Habib, R., & Dixon, M. R. (2010) Neurobe-
havioral evidence for the "Near-Miss" ef-
fect in pathological gamblers. Journal of 
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 
93, 313-328.  
Haw, J. (2008). The relationship between re-
inforcement and gambling machine 
choice, Journal of Gambling Studies, 24, 
55-61. 
Haw, J. (2009). The multiplier potential of 
slot machines predict (sic) bet size. Analy-
sis of Gambling Behavior, 3, 1-6.   
Herrnstein, R. J. (1997). The Matching Law: 
Papers in Economics and Psychology. 
(Edited by H. Rachlin & D. I. Laibson). 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation / 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Heyman, G. (2009). Addiction: A Disorder of 
Choice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
 
 
Hoon, A., Dymond, S., Jackson, J. W., & 
Dixon, M. R. (2008). Contextual control 
of slot-machine gambling: replication and 
extension, Journal of Applied Behavior 
Analysis, 41, 467-470.  
Jessup, R. K., & O'Doherty, J. P. (2011) Hu-
man dorsal striatal activity during choice 
discriminates reinforcement learning be-
havior from the Gambler's Fallacy. Jour-
nal of Neuroscience, 31, 6296-6304. 
Kassinove, J. I., & Schare, M. L. (2001). Ef-
fects of the “near miss” and the “big win” 
on persistence at slot machine gambling. 
Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 15, 
155-158. 
Ladouceur, R., Gaboury, A., Dumont, M., & 
Rochette, P. (1988). Gambling: relation-
ship between the frequency of wins and ir-
rational thinking, The Journal of Psychol-
ogy, 122, 409-414. 
Langer, E. J. (1975). The illusion of control. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 32, 311-328. 
Lesieur, H. R., & Blume, S. B. (1987). The 
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS): a 
new instrument for the identification of 
pathological gamblers. American Journal 
of Psychiatry, 144, 184-188. 
MacLin, O. H., Dixon, M. R., Daugherty, D., 
& Small, S. L. (2007). Using a computer 
simulation of three slot machines to inves-
tigate a gambler’s preference among vary-
ing densities of near-miss alternatives. 
BehaviorResearch Methods, 39, 237-241. 
Martin, Peter, R., & Petry, N. M. (2005). Are 
non-substance-related addictions really 
addictions?. The American Journal on 
Addictions, 14, 1-7. 
Mehrabian, A. (1980). Basic Dimensions for a 
General Psychological Theory. Cam-
bridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and 
Hain.  
 
 
 
16
Analysis of Gambling Behavior, Vol. 6 [2012], Art. 2
https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/agb/vol6/iss1/2
  GORDON R. FOXALL & VALDIMAR SIGURDSSON 7
   
 
Miller, J. C., Dixon, M. R., Parker, A., Kul-
land, A. M., & Weatherly, J. N. (2010). 
Concurrent validity of the gambling func-
tion assessment (GFA): Correlations with 
the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) 
and indicators of diagnostic efficiency. 
Analysis of Gambling Behavior, 4, 61-75. 
Nastally, B. L. (2010). Functional Investiga-
tion of and Treatment Strategies for the 
Near Miss Effect in Gambling. PhD Dis-
sertation. Southern Illinois University.  
Nastally, B. L., Dixon, M. R., & Jackson, J. 
W. (2010). Manipulating slot machine 
preference in problem gambling through 
contextual control, Journal of Applied Be-
havior Analysis, 43, 125-129. 
Qi, S., Ding, C., Song, Y., & Yang. D. (2011). 
Neural correlates of near-misses effect in 
gambling. Neuroscience Letters, 493, 80-
85. 
Petry, N. M. (2005). Pathological Gambling: 
Etiology, Comorbidity, and Treatment. 
Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association.   
Raylu, N., & Oei, T. P. (2004). The Gambling 
Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS): devel-
opment, confirmatory factor validation 
and psychometric properties. Addiction, 
99, 757-769. 
Reuter, J., Raedler, T., Rose, M., Hand, I., 
Gläscher, J., & Büchel, C. (2005). Patho-
logical gambling is linked to reduced acti-
vation of the mesolimbic reward system. 
Nature Neuroscience, 8, 147-148. 
Rolls, E. T. (2005). Emotion explained. Ox-
ford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Ross, D., Kincaid, H., Spurrett, D., & Collins, 
P. (2010). (Eds.) What is addiction? Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Ross, D., Sharp, C., Vuchinich, R. E., & 
Spurrett, D. (2008). Midbrain Mutiny. The 
Picoeconomics and Neuroeconomics of 
Disordered Gambling. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.  
 
Roy, A., Adinoff, B., Roerich, L., Custer, R., 
Lorenz, V., Barbaccia, M., Guidotti, A., 
Costa, E., & Linnoila, M. (1988). Patho-
logical gambling: A psychobiological 
study. Archives of General Psychiatry, 45, 
369-373. 
Schott, B. H., Minuzzi, L., Krebs, R. M., 
Elmenhurst, D., Lang, M., Winz, O. H. 
Seidenbecher, C., Hoenen, H. H., Heinze, 
H. J., Ziles, K., Durzel, E, & Bauer, A. 
(2008). Mesolimbic functional magnetic 
resonance image activations during re-
ward-related ventral striatal dopamine re-
lease. Journal of Neuroscience, 28, 
14311-14319. 
Schultz, W. (2002). Getting formal with do-
pamine and reward. Neuron, 36, 241-263. 
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and Human 
Behavior. New York: Macmillan.  
Weatherly, J. N., & Flannery-Woehl, K. A. 
(2009). Do cognitive fallacies predict be-
havior when non-pathological gamblers 
play slot machines and video poker? 
Analysis of Gambling Behavior, 3, 7-14.  
Weatherly, J. N., Thompson, B. J., Hodny, 
M., & Meier, E. (2009). Choice behavior 
of nonpathological women playing con-
currently available slot machines: effect of 
changes in payback percentages, Journal 
of Applied Behavior Analysis, 42, 895-
900. 
Weatherly, J. N., Montes, K. S., & Christo-
pher, D. M. (2010). Investigating the rela-
tionship between escape and gambling 
behavior. Analysis of Gambling Behavior, 
4, 79-87. 
Winstanley, C. A., Cocker, P. J., & Rogers, R. 
D. (2011). Dopamine modulates reward 
expectancy during performance of a slot 
machine task in rats: evidence for a “near-
miss” effect. Neuropsychopharmacology, 
36, 913-925. 
 
 
 
17
Foxall and Sigurdsson: When Loss Reward: The Near-Miss Effect in Slot Machine Gamblin
Published by theRepository at St. Cloud State, 2012
6 WHEN LOSS REWARDS  
 
Wohl, M. J. A., & Enzle, M. E. (2003). The 
effects of near wins and near losses on 
self-perceived personal luck and subse-
quent gambling behaviour. Journal of Ex-
perimental Social Psychology, 39, 184-
191. 
Wood, W. S., & Clapham, M. M. (2006). 
Rules gamblers play by – and shouldn’t. 
In Ghezzi, P. M., Lyons, C. A., Dixon, M. 
R. & Wilson, G. R. (Eds.) Gambling: Be-
havior Theory, Research and Application. 
(pp. 191-205). Reno, NV: Context Press. 
Yan, J., Foxall, G. R., & Doyle, J. R. (in press 
a). Patterns of Reinforcement and the Es-
sential Value of Brands: II. Evaluation of 
a Model of Consumer Choice. The Psy-
chological Record.  
Yan, J., Foxall, G. R., & Doyle, J. R. (in press 
b). Patterns of Reinforcement and the 
Essential Value of Brands: I. 
Incorporation of Utilitarian and 
Informational Reinforcement into the 
Estimation of Demand. The Psychological 
Record. 
 Zlomke, K. R., & Dixon, M. R. (2006). Mod-
ification of slot-machine preferences 
through use of a conditioned discrimina-
tion paradigm, Journal of Applied Behav-
ior Analysis, 39, 351-361.  
Zeeb, F. D., Robbins, T. W., & Winstanley, 
C. A. (2009). Serotonergic and dopamin-
ergic modulation of gambling behaviour 
as assessed using a novel rat gambling 
task, Neuropsychopharmacology, 34: 
2329–2343.  
 
  
Action Editor: Jeffrey N. Weatherly 
 
 
18
Analysis of Gambling Behavior, Vol. 6 [2012], Art. 2
https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/agb/vol6/iss1/2
